

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN PAK-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP: A STUDY OF AYUB'S ERA (1958-1960)

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ABSTRACT

With the advent of 21st century, the stress over Pak-China bilateral relationship has increased drastically. China being one of the pioneers in world trade and often referred to as the upcoming world economic leader has healthy bilateral terms with Pakistan, progressing further day by day. The inception of strong engagements between Pak-China has its roots back to the Sino-Pak Border Treaty of 1963. Since then, the bilateral relationships between the countries improved and China has been a strong supporter of Pakistan in every matter till date.

The concreteness of Sino-Pak bilateral terms is generally attributed to the foreign policy measures adopted by Ayub Khan. The Sino-Pak border treaty was signed during the military regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan that proved as the cornerstone of Sino-Pak long-term relationships. Since then, China has been of great assistance to Pakistan in terms of economic and military aids. This paper acutely peeps into the historical foreign policy measures of Pakistan during Ayub's era. The challenges that have been fronted by Ayub Khan to maintain healthy relationships with China while maintaining the terms with other world leaders simultaneously. This paper concludes in the light of the collected facts that it was not Ayub Khan who overemphasized on Sino-Pak bilateral terms, but it was rather the need of time and for the prosperous future of Pakistan.

KEYWORDS: Pak-China Bilateral Relationship, Sino-Pak Bilateral, Ayub Khan to Maintain Healthy Relationships

INTRODUCTION

Emergence of Pakistan and China as Separate Countries

During the twentieth century, the international borders were undergoing drastic changes as result of wars of invasion, wars of independence, economic disparity and political unrest (Rosenau&Czempiel, 1992). The Indo-Pak separation is not a major event in midst of such changes however, it is a unique event of its nature; where, homeland was conceptualized based upon an 'ideology' (Hussain, 1996). While there were many factors to influence this cause, the ideology was the forerunner as it is most relatable to the masses. Thus ideology was uniquely based on religion and was based on Two – Nation theory based on independence scheme for people belonging to differing religions yet having not so very distinct culture from each other (Alavi, 1988).

Emergence of Pakistan on the face of the map was a historic event, as recorded by the historians who observed the Pakistan movement. Individuals who sympathized with the cause of distinct Muslim identity, the need to nurture and protect it from being compromised in the Hindu majority sub-continent, asserted that Pakistan was circumstantial product and an instinctive response to the strong aspirations displayed by the Muslims (Verma, 2001).

'The Two Nation' theory summarizes the plight of Muslims in the sub-continent exhaustively, that the two religions may have been coexisting in the region but they do not necessarily are existing in harmony. Out of religious ground too, the theory applied where government offices and political representation was concerned. The rights of minorities were superseded by the influential and intolerant majority (Adeney, 2002).

After the war of independence, political leaders like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Sir Syed championed the idea of Hindu-Muslim unity amongst their English rulers but were soon disillusioned by the Hindu leaders who showed no intent of bridging the gap. Thus, began the quest for an independent homeland based upon ideology of exclusive Muslim state.

The Congress and Muslim League were the two major political parties taking part in the discussion to decide the fate of sub-continent with their English masters; with English exiting the region and increasing civil unrest led to the eventual distribution of the land.

China has more than 4000 years of recorded history where various dynasties have ruled the land. Qing Dynasty in 1800's was practitioners of strict isolationism which eventually led to their downfall when the traders from the West flocked in with Opium. Thus, began the era of Four Opium wars, where traders despite the ban imported and cultivated Opium (Beeching, 1975).

On the rural front, communists gained strength and structure to surround the nationalists in the cities. Even though the two parties tried to join forces to unite the nation but their polar agendas soon resulted in civil war. Following the aftermath of Opium war and the reduced strength of the Government, in 1931, Japan attacked the region with the intent to invade. The war lasted till after WWII due to which China lost control of Hong Kong to England and other cities were 'leased' to the Westerns (Wesley-Smith, 1988).

The Chinese communist party gained enough momentum and support from the masses to declared independence on October 01, 1949 – making Mao Zedong the chairman of the party, the first official of the People's Republic of China (Selden, 1980).

The government then announced the five year plans to modernize and develop the infrastructure and facilities associated with agriculture, irrigation and water management. However, two famines hit the region and killed 30 million people. 'One Hundred Flower' campaign was launched to instill creative freedom amongst the masses, however, the government was not tolerant toward any anti-state sentiments which was not a popular move in the public; as all anti-state speakers were purged which included critics and scholars and masses, alike. These strict measures, however, were not all negative and though communism was at the back, China struggled its way to make an impact on the global map in the early years (Meisner, 1999).

Geostrategic Importance of Pakistan and China

Pakistan is a part of South Asia, a region that has been looked as one with great economic, strategic and political importance. USA looks at Pakistan with greater strategic intent and so does Russia, which is looking for a close ally in this region. Pakistan shares a 400 km border with China in the North, though; accessibility due to difficult weather conditions has been difficult. A 13 km Wakhan Strip separates Pakistan from Russia (now Tajikistan). In the east, Pakistan shares a 1650 km border with India and on its west; it shares a 2250 km border with Afghanistan known as the Durand Line (Khan & Effendi, 2000). Also, in the west, it shares a border with Iran in the Persian Gulf where almost 65% of the world oil is

produced. To the South, Pakistan has an approximate coastline of 800 km in the hot water Indian Ocean.

In terms of geostrategic importance, Pakistan lies between Russia and China, world's two biggest powers. Due to this, it demands friendly relations from most of the neighboring countries. Also, the world powers look Pakistan as the region with immense talent and the gateway for power. Moreover, the strong army of Pakistan means that it acts as deterrence among these great powers (Malik, 1996).

These powers also know that future game of power will revolve near Central Asia which is laden with oil and energy resources. They know that future crisis in the world will be governed by oil and energy. Other than Central Asia, Pakistan is equally close to the oil rich Gulf countries and shares a maritime border with them (Xu, 1999).

China is currently the world's second largest country in the world by land after Russian and third or fourth largest by total area, after Russia, Canada and USA. China has the longest combined border of land that starts in the Subcontinent and ends in Far East Asia. China shares its border with Vietnam and Burma in Southeast and India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan in South. It also shares borders with Central Asian countries and Afghanistan (Abeysinghe&Ding, 2003). The maritime border of China extends to South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

As far as demographics of China are concerned, the majority population (with the highest birth rate) lives in only 22% of the territory, concentrated in a region on 600 miles wide coastline. The other 78% of the territory is thinly populated by the minorities who reside in China. These minorities has doubtful loyalty towards the Chinese Government and have strained relationship with them. Also, these minorities have active cross border ties with the neighboring countries, thus, having conflict of interest (Stadtler-Chester, 2014).

The long borders of China pose a difficult challenge as they are long and open to invasions from sea since they are not easier to defend. The land borders, however, are easier to guard since they are highly mountainous and prone to adverse weather conditions. Also, the biggest potential threat to China's existence is more internal than external.

Importance of Pak – China Bilateral Relationships

Pak China ties of diplomacy got birth in 1951, soon after the Chinese Independence. Ever since then, these relationships have gone to newer heights and have grown in all avenues. Pakistan was the third country and first Muslim country to recognize the People's Republic of China and have ever since remained a close ally. During the international isolation of Beijing in 1960's and 1970's, Pakistan remained the closest confidant of China. China, on the other had has always provided Pakistan with the required technical, military and economic assistance. The more controversial of these helps have been the assistance in nuclearprograms and defense weaponry. It has been pretty evident that Chinese inclination has been more towards Pakistan than any country in the region and this has been further strengthened by the US inclination towards India. The real issues so far in Pak China relationships have been though the increase insurgency of militant wings on Pak China Border (Haider, 2005).

There has been another opinion on how the strategic ties of Pakistan are aligned. As per China's perspective, Pakistan provides a low cost deterrence to India. Similarly, India is aware of the fact that China would act as Pakistan's defense guarantor, if attacked. The hostile and volatile relationship of Pakistan and India is known too all and with Kashmir in the close proximity of China, the relations between Pakistan and India are of immense importance to each other (Afridi & Bajoria, 2010).

Indian has been pretty skeptical about this approach taken by China as it views this as a barricade to increasing New Dehli role in the region. The Sino-Indian war proved to both the countries that it's not easy for them to maintain economic harmony if they were at loggerheads against each other (Liu, 1994). From the economic standpoint, both the countries have cooperated on large infrastructure projects and large number of Chinese labor is doing projects in Pakistan. The access to Pakistani warm waters is another project that China is eyeing at. With this access, the Persian Gulf is just in the striking distance of China. Also, the resource rich Xingjiang province will have access to the Arabian Sea. Pakistan has falling investment and a weak economy which is securing pivotal ties with Beijing. This relation of commensalism is pivotal for not only both the countries but also for the balance of power in the region.

AYUB'S ERA AND PAK-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS

Political Turmoil and Ayub's Martial Law

The command of Pakistani army by a Pakistani officer after the British left was a matter of political danger and political importance as it was assumed that they will try and get control. Due to this usurpation fear, a young officer was selected as the Army Chief known as Ayub Khan. Also, Ayub Khan being non – Punjabi and efficient administrator meant that there was a wide consent over his selection. The Government thought that this man would be kept in check by other military personnel and he would not dare to turn up the table against the establishment or bureaucracy (Ziring, 1971).

From 1951 onwards, Ayub Khan increased the role of military in power and politics. In 1958, Ayub finally overpowered the puppet Government and installed himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Soon after coming into the power, Ayub decided to strengthen the policy relationships with strong growing Chinese economy and the Soviets. The Soviets showed him a cold hand so he decided to invest all his energies in strengthening relationships with China which was slowly but surely coming out of isolation. Ayub also was on friendly terms with US, so that deterrence against India could be established (Rizvi, 2000).

Ayub changed the capital from Karachi to Islamabad which was a good sign for Beijing since it was in near proximity to the borders of China. Within the martial law, Ayub suppressed the black marketers and hoarders who were causing trouble to him on the political front. Adhering to the Chinese program of land confiscation, Ayub on similar terms carried out a program of taking land from aristocracy and handing it over to the middle sized land owners. It differed in the sense that peasants were offered very little land.

Ayub's downfall started as a result of his stance taken during the Tashkent Declaration and his stand towards the political parties and his disrespect towards Fatima Jinnah and the union of other parties. Also, his role as a dictator during Indus Basin Treaty was deemed negative by political experts (Gauhar, 1985).

Strengthening of Pak China Relationships and Sino-Indian War

Initially, in 1950's Pakistan showed interest towards the western bloc by signing CEATO and SENTO. This was seen as a serious threat to nascent communist bloc which was developing in the South and Central Asian Region. China also wasn't happy with this development of Pakistan's close ties with the West. China was of the opinion that US has vested interests in this region as it was allying to keep Soviet Union in check (Levi, 1962). Beijing was also not happy with Pakistan's role in the whole scenario since it considered Pakistan as its partner in its strategic buildup in the region.

Pakistani diplomats went to the Manila Conference with only one aim and that was to ensure China that Pakistan's signing of CEATO and SENTO didn't mean the Sino – Pak relations won't flourish and Pakistan would allow its land for

any aggressive offence against China. The China ambassador called the Pakistani foreign office at the Bandung conference where the Afro – Asian leaders were meeting. In this conference, Pakistan and China grew closer and it was established that both these countries can co – exist (Dobell, 1964). This success at the diplomatic level meant that China recognized the importance of having Pakistan as its ally in the region. Also, the conference backfired for the Indian diplomats since their dominating role was perceived as negative by the Chinese government and this would gradually grow to territorial disputes later between the two giants of Asia.

The most notable dispute, however, came during Ayub's time when he openly supported the movements in Tibet and the Taiwanese mission embracement in Karachi, the then capital of Pakistan. China, on the other hand, was surprised by this behavior and their media took a hard hit at Ayub's statement (Kondapalli, 2007). This policy got a hammering at home when the foreign minister reinstated the fact that Pakistan cannot go against China and have sour relations with them. Ayub was advised that he should bring China to negotiation and cool US who were supplying India with much needed technology. India, on the other hand was facing border disputes with China as they provided asylum to Dalai Lama.

Ayub quickly realized the need of an hour and decided to open relations with China that had deteriorated. In this respect, Pakistan and China decided to demarcate their borders. China demarcated the border and in return, Pakistan ensured its complete support for China in the UN. At this critical juncture, India accused China of violating its border in Kashmir and Northern provinces (Sharma, 1965). In the meanwhile, India continuously violated the Line of Control in the Rann of Kutch, while receiving full support from the US and the USSR (Liu, 1994). Pakistan condemned this war as Indian weaponry was bought from the US. China, too, was also not very happy at Indian policy towards its territories. The border agreement was finally settled in the early 60's between Pakistan and China which not only was a blow to Indian – US alliance, but also provided both the countries with strategic and economic benefits.

This opened up the air and land routes and PIA got a greater land area to operate. The US rejected the aid for Dacca airport, and instead China helped building that airport. According to Z.A.Bhutto, Pakistan missed the golden opportunity of settling Kashmir dispute when Sino – Indian war was in full swing. China supported Pakistan Army in 1965 war and threatened India of its criminal aggression. In due course, both the countries signed a pact and termed each other, as the most favorable partners of trade.

Engagements with China for Economic Prosperity and Deterrence

This led to a formal opening of sharing of talent and resource not between in armies but also in industrial workforce of the two countries. China provided million rupees worth machinery for the Heavy industries Taxila project (Sekhar, 2005). Also, it provided interest-free loans to the economy of Pakistan. China's successful hydrogen bomb experiment in 1967 was greatly celebrated in Pakistan as it gave it unprecedented edge in the region. Pakistan also acted to strengthen US and China relations by being diplomatically active. This ensured the US that Pakistan was the only route for their relations with China and this, further strengthened the position of Pakistan on a diplomatic front.

In a nutshell, the importance of the geo-strategic location of Pakistan with reference to China was being widely accepted by other countries. This was the time when Pakistan capitalized its relationship with China as a measure to safeguard its sovereignty and to ensure its sound existence in global arena forever.

Foreign Policy during Ayub's Era

One of the most important tools that also serves as a guideline for a nation to determine its future strategies is

Foreign policy. The importance of foreign policy has increased significantly after the end of World War II. Ever since the United Nations came into existence, countries immediately recognized the importance of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relationships (Wood & Peake, 1998).

In order to maintain healthy diplomatic relationships with other countries, it was prudent to have a uniform policy that could be serve as a code to bring uniformity in the patterns of interaction with other states. This idea lead the think tanks of nations to outline foreign policy that could cater the needs of the rapidly changing global arena.

Pakistan, being a newborn state, emphasized vociferously on its foreign policy in order to maintain its position in international arena. The geo-strategic importance of Pakistan was not enough to help maintain healthy diplomatic relationships with the world leaders out there. Therefore, the need of a sound foreign policy was recognized promptly and the same was fulfilled commensurately as well in the early years of Pakistan's birth (Bruke & Ziring, 1990). Let us analyze briefly the foreign policy measures that were carried out during Ayub's era.

Foreign Policy Measures during Ayub's Era

As addressed by Field Marshal Ayub Khan to Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on August 25th, 1961, Pakistan desperately needed a Foreign Policy that could not only bring about the ideological integration of Pakistan, but also rebuild its society along with ensuring its territorial security too (Lerski, 1974). These three points were specifically stressed out by the Field Marshal in his address, thereby showing the importance of these factors. Let us elucidate these factors with more brevity with reference to the prevailing scenario at that time.

The first need as identified by Ayub Khan was ideological integration of Pakistan, by which he meant the Islamic way of life. Islam, apart from religion, is a complete code of life, therefore, it was felt necessary to ensure that the life-pattern of Pakistani Muslims is in accordance with the teachings of Islam (Ansari, 1970).

Since Pakistan was going through tough times after its independence, Ayub Khan realized the importance of rebuilding the society i.e. to combat the problems being faced by the society in a newly born state. Ayub Khan wanted a foreign policy so impeccable and diverse that could cope up with the problems that had surrounded Pakistan at that time.

The biggest threat that Pakistan faced soon after its independence was lack of funds (due to unequal distribution of resources by the predecessors), which inevitably translated as being a threat to national security (Soligo, 1967). Therefore, Ayub Khan stressed on chalking out an effective foreign policy that could also take care of the concerns regarding the national security.

This was the idea that lead to the development of a strong foreign policy during the regime of Ayub Khan. Emphasis was laid on maintaining healthy bilateral relationships with the global powers. It was the farsightedness of Ayub Khan that he realized the potential of China as being the future world leader. Therefore, carefully tailored policy measures were adopted in order to strengthen the bilateral diplomatic relationships with China.

Role of Foreign Policy to Strengthen Pak-China Bilateral Relationships

Foreign policy of Pakistan has played a pivotal role in strengthening the bilateral diplomatic relationships between China and Pakistan. Ayub Khan with the help of his farsightedness and sheer brilliance adopted friendly foreign policies that could safeguard the existence of Pakistan (Sattar, 2007). While the diplomatic ties of Pakistan with India and Soviet Union were deteriorating, however, at the same time Pak-China relationship were strengthening.

Ayub Khan brought forward the policies that lead to strong military engagements between both the countries. Realizing the potential that could be capitalized with the help of China, Ayub Khan laid stress on strong diplomatic ties with its neighbor (Sharma, 1968). Although, the strengthening of Pak-China relationship was not being encouraged by United States, mainly due to her own vested interests, but Ayub Khan still maintained healthy relationships.

Things turned out favorable for Pakistan after the Sino-Indian war. Since Pakistan had had turbulent relationships with India, Ayub Khan took steps to further its bilateral relationships with China (Garver, 1996). In the early years after independence, Pakistan offered India to form alliance in order to protect its northern borders. However, the offer was turned down by India, thereby leaving Pakistan in a state of distress with reference to its northern borders.

Sino-Indian war provided an opportunity that Ayub Khan encashed by resolving its border disputes with China and by furthering bilateral relationship with its northern neighbor (Ganguly, 1990). The negotiations regarding the border dispute resolution was initiated in the month of October, 1962 and peaceful resolution of the dispute was attained by mutual negotiations within two months. This proved to be a huge success for Pakistan and the initiation of long-term healthy relationship with the upcoming world economic leader.

Huge military aids to India on behalf of Sino-Indian war were a potential threat to Pakistan, considering the unfriendly bilateral relationships with India. Therefore, in turn, Pakistan started strengthening its relationships with China, of which China-Pakistan border treaty of 1963 is strong evidence (Vertzberger, 1983).

It is pertinent to mention here that most of the powerful nations were against the alliance of Pak-China, as it was considered as a severe threat to other powerful nations. The most stringent reaction was showed by United States in this regard. In order to neutralize the heat that was being built, Ayub Khan wrote a book 'Friends not masters' in which he not only evaluated the situation critically, but also specified his stance in connection with foreign policy (Khan, 1967).

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was holding the portfolio of foreign minister during Ayub's era. It was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who recommended maintaining icy relations with India, while strengthening ties with China. The holistic view of the scenario, lead Ayub Khan to exploit the differences of India with USSR and Sino-Indian War to establish strong alliance with China.

Pak-China Alliance and Foreign Policy Challenges

The biggest challenge of all time for Ayub Khan was to tackle the superpowers of the world. The world leaders considered the alliance of Pak-China as a form of unfavorable event for them. Reservations soared, differences heightened and bilateral relationships of Pakistan with the major stakeholders of world politics went haywire.

Ayub Khan being a lateral thinker, wanted Pakistan to develop and prosper along the pathway of its ideology. He soon figured out that the newborn state needs alliance with the other countries of world, therefore, tried hard to translate his ideas through foreign policy. Ayub Khan always emphasized on friendly bilateral relationships and never wanted Pakistan to be a sub-ordinate of any other country. This was the reason why Ayub Khan never sealed any deal for less than highest returns for Pakistan.

Although, Ayub Khan was attempting to maintain entente with India and other bordering countries, however, the Indus water treaty lead to a dispute between India and Pakistan. Such a situation at that time was beyond the scope of the Foreign Policy and a short-term action plan was needed to control the situation (Biswas, 1992).

The entente of Pakistan with China was like a spinal support for Pakistan, which helped Pakistan to negotiate with India on equal basis. However, the diplomatic attempts under the light of foreign policy went hogwash, thereby initiating the war of 1965 between India and Pakistan. This came as another shock to Pakistan and its foreign policy. It is pertinent to mention here that despite Soviets being furious on Pak-US alliance, Ayub Khan managed to secure Soviet neutrality during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 (Porter, 1986).

Extraction of historical evidences support the claim that it was US and other world leaders that forced India to initiate war with Pakistan. It is because of the fact that Pakistan was not under their strong influence anymore after signing the border treaty with China. Therefore, in order to curb the communist China and to regain the influence over Pakistan, the western bloc set this war up between India and Pakistan.

This situation made it difficult for Ayub Khan to think of a way that could help Pakistan make alliance with US as well as with China at the same time. This was the time when the idea of ruling over Kashmir started fading away and Ayub Khan gave green signal to operation 'Gibraltar' under the supervision of the then Pakistan Air Force chief Air Marshal Asghar Khan.

CONCLUSIONS

Short-Term and Long-Term Implications of Ayub Khan's Foreign Policy

The implications of the drift in the foreign policymaking of Pakistan during Ayub's era can be assessed using the notion of Short-term and Long-term. The short-term implications of the drastic change in the foreign policy during Ayub's era are highlighted below:

- Since Ayub Khan never wanted Pakistan to become sub-ordinate of world powers, therefore, the change in the foreign policy brought by Ayub Khan lead Pakistan to maintain relationships with world leaders on equal footing.
- In the very short-run, the bilateral relationships between Pakistan and its neighboring countries improved and paved paths for the prosperity of Pakistan.
- The Kashmir issue went off the track as Sino-Pakistan relationships improved. The status of Sino-Pakistan bilateral terms triggered US to enrage India, thereby bringing upon Pakistan the Kashmir conflict and Indo-Pak war of 1965.
- The new makeover to the foreign policy of Pakistan transformed the way Pakistan was maintaining its bilateral relationships to the world leaders. It emphasized on the fact that Pakistan is not subjugate to any of them and the key to maintain healthy terms with Pakistan is not by dictating the terms but by being friendly.

On the other hand the long-term implications of the drifts in foreign policy of Pakistan are as under:

- The new makeover of the foreign policy paved path for Sino-Pakistan long-term friendly bilateral relationships, because of which, Pakistan is enjoying military and economic assistance from China till date.
- It proved to be a nudge that reshaped the thinking of world leaders regarding Pakistan. A new frame of reference was created that helped Pakistan negotiate with other countries with equal footing.
- The Indo-Pak diplomatic relationships went haywire in an attempt to maintain balanced bilateral relationships with other countries. The dismay of Indo-Pak relationship later translated into the war of 1965 and by extension

'Fall of Dhaka' in 1971.

Did Ayub Khan Overemphasized on Pak-China Bilateral Relationships?

The review of the above literature goes on to support the fact that Ayub Khan didn't really over emphasize the relationship with China. He realized that the state of China was still in infancy and the widening demarcations of the Communist and Capitalist block won't make China the central state. Therefore, Pakistan signed the CEATO and SENTO which were viewed really negatively in China. China, too, during the times of Ayub got into international isolation and although they supported the Communist cause, they weren't real proponents of it. This led to a belief for Ayub Khan that China wasn't an important state that will be of any beneficial importance to Pakistan in the longer run. During this time, however, China was progressing as a nation and a society as well. They were achieving technological excellence and were ensuring that they are contingent enough to foresee the issues in the future. They started setting up industries and build on a service delivery model which was abstract not only to Pakistan but to the whole world.

During the initial years, China was viewed as an indifferent nation to the whole interest of the West in the region. It was only after Manila conference that differences in Pakistan and China narrowed, thanks to the extreme belief of Z.A. Bhutto who thought that China in the longer run would be Pakistan's greatest strategic partner. At this conference, the Pakistani diplomats ensured China that Pakistan won't allow its land to be used against China. China on the other hand, called the Pakistani delegation for another conference in China. Again, the emphasis on these bilateral ties weren't Ayub's agenda but Bhutto's, who held the Foreign Minister portfolio at that time. Ayub on the other hand, continued support for unrest in Xingjiang Province and the Taiwanese movements.

This created a bitter taste in the mouth and Chinese media came out openly speaking against Pakistani government. Luck, though, favored Pakistan as India was busy settling its border issues with China which eventually led to the Sino – Indian war and also the US were providing Indian with military and defense support. Ayub, after some years in power, started emphasizing on the importance of these relations and supported China's entry in the UN. The border agreement was settled with Pakistan and China both submitting some of their land which ensured that the foundation stone for great association was laid.

What Can Be Defined as a 'Crux' of This Whole Story?

The fact that China is emerging as a world leader in global politics is very hard to be set aside. China has a significant position in the prevailing structure of world politics. The roots of Pak-China relationships can be traced back to 1951 when Pakistan accepted People's Republic of China as a separate nation on the globe.

The elements of healthy bilateral diplomatic relationships between China and Pakistan were absent until Ayub Khan filled in the gaps with building blocks. The efforts of Ayub Khan to improve the relationships with China were remarkable and meritorious in a sense that it provides an evidence of the farsightedness of Ayub Khan.

Regardless of strong global opposition for making alliance with communist China, Ayub Khan never retreated. Being a military strategist, Ayub Khan realized the importance of military and economic alliance with China. The only way to obtain a strong position as a separate nation in world politics and to ensure safety against the threat of India, furthering Sino-Pakistan relationships was the only appropriate remedy that Ayub Khan carried. This helped Pakistan to gain a strong geo-strategic position in sub-continent at that time.

In a nutshell, the early developments in Sino-Pakistan bilateral relationships can be attributed to foreign policy of Ayub's era, as it served as a building block for long-term friendly bilateral relationships with China, the benefits of which are still being harvested by both the countries.

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